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The widespread availability of behavioral data has led to the development of data-driven personalized pricing algorithms:
sellers attempt to maximize their revenue by estimating the consumer’s willingness-to-pay and pricing accordingly. Our
objective is to develop algorithms that protect consumer interests against personalized pricing schemes. In this paper, we
consider a consumer who learns more and more about a potential purchase across time, while simultaneously revealing
more and more information about herself to a potential seller. We formalize a strategic consumer’s purchasing decision
when interacting with a seller who uses personalized pricing algorithms, and contextualize this problem among the existing
literature in optimal stopping time theory and computational finance. We provide an algorithm that consumers can use to
protect their own interests against personalized pricing algorithms. This algorithmic stopping method uses sample paths
to train estimates of the optimal stopping time. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first works that provides
computational methods for the consumer to maximize her utility when decision making under surveillance. We demonstrate
the efficacy of the algorithmic stopping method using a numerical simulation, where the seller uses a Kalman filter to
approximate the consumer’s valuation and sets prices based on myopic expected revenue maximization. Compared to a
myopic purchasing strategy, we demonstrate increased payoffs for the consumer in expectation.
1 INTRODUCTION
The widespread availability of behavioral data has led to the development of data-driven personalized pricing
algorithms: sellers attempt to maximize their revenue by estimating the consumer’s willingness-to-pay and
pricing accordingly. Thus, if some observable features about you suggest that you may value a product more, you
will see a higher price from sellers using these pricing algorithms. In the current age of data collection, there are
many observable features for each individual, and these algorithms have increasingly refined methods to target
customers and price to extract as much consumer surplus as possible.
Whether or not these methods are beneficial to society, or ethical, still remains an open question. One could
argue that personalized pricing allows more voluntary trade to occur than would be possible with uniform
pricing, and thus the societal benefits from trade are increased as a result of personalized pricing. In this light,
personalized pricing moves the market to a more efficient allocation [32]. However, there is also evidence that
many of these algorithms aversely affect certain populations more than others [5]: race and gender are, in
particularly, commonly used for statistical inference about reservation prices.
Regardless of the societal or ethical implications, personalized pricing schemes are currently deployed in
practice. Airlines use them to price ancillary services and products, such as in-flight meals, baggage allowance,
and legroom [28]. On websites such as Orbitz, Expedia, Hotels.com, and Priceline, the offered options and pricing
of plan tickets, hotels, and car rentals depend on the consumer’s features (e.g. OS/browser, age, income) and
browsing history, which are assumed to be correlated with their valuation of such goods [13]. Web-pages use
tracking to determine how much to charge advertisers to place their ads [12]. Similarly, e-retailers will set prices
based on consumer context [13]. For example, Home Depot and Staples were both known for increasing prices if
a consumer’s zip code was farther from a brick-and-mortar store.
Our objective is to develop algorithms that protect consumer interests against personalized pricing schemes.
In this paper, we consider a consumer who learns more and more about a potential purchase across time, while
simultaneously revealing more and more information about herself to a potential seller. For example, a consumer
may browse the website to learn more about airline tickets or a pair of boots, and, as she leaves behind a trail of
cookies across multiple websites, retailers increasingly have a better sense of her reservation prices and can set
prices accordingly. It is unclear how a consumer should behave in these settings. Should she purchase earlier, at a
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2higher level of uncertainty, to reduce the information she reveals to sellers? Should she take a risk and wait for
prices to drop in the future, even though a purchase at the current moment would yield positive utility?
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows.
• We formalize a strategic consumer’s purchasing decision when interacting with a seller who uses personal-
ized pricing algorithms, and contextualize this problem among the existing literature in optimal stopping
time theory and computational finance.
• We provide an algorithm that consumers can use to protect their own interests against personalized pricing
algorithms. This algorithmic stopping method uses sample paths to train estimates of the optimal stopping
time. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first works that provides computational methods for
the consumer to maximize her utility when decision making under surveillance.
• We demonstrate the efficacy of this algorithm using a numerical simulation, where the seller uses a
Kalman filter to approximate the consumer’s valuation and sets prices based on myopic expected revenue
maximization. Compared to a myopic purchasing strategy, we demonstrate increased payoffs for the
consumer in expectation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the literature most related to our work and
contextualize our contributions. In Section 3, we outline the mathematical model of the consumer’s decision, and
define her optimization problem. With the model introduced, we characterize the consumer’s optimal decisions
in Section 4. We present an algorithm for the computation of the consumer’s decisions in Section 5, which
approximates the optimal stopping time. In Section 6, we present a numerical example demonstrating how
an algorithmic stopping time approach can improve the consumer’s payoff in a stylized model of surveillance
capitalism. Finally, we close with some concluding remarks in Section 7.
1.1 Notation
Throughout this paper, we use the following notation. For a vectorv with index set I , we will frequently writev in
terms of its elementsv = (vi )i ∈I or, in brief, (vi )i . All random elements will be with respect to the same underlying
probability space (Ω,A, P). We write E to denote the expectation operator, and may subscript EX∼ν f (X ) to
denote that X is distributed according to the probability measure ν . For any sub-σ -algebra F ⊆ A, we write
Y ∈ F to denote that Y is a F measurable function. We represent the conditional expectation operator as E[·|F ];
this is the projection operator in L2 onto the space of F measurable functions, i.e. for any random variable X ,
we define E[X |F ] as the P almost surely unique F measurable function such that E[E[X |F ]Y ] = E[XY ] for any
Y ∈ F . For a random element X , we write σ (X ) to denote the σ -algebra generated by X . We let f ∨ д denote the
point-wise maximum of two functions f and д.
2 RELATED LITERATURE
In this section, we provide an overview of the existing literature related to this work.
Personalized pricing is a special form of dynamic pricing. Dynamic pricing, broadly speaking, refers to any
pricing methods where the seller uses his available information to set prices. For example, in the 1990s, Coca-Cola
researched how to make vending machines whose prices varied with temperature: on a hot day, charge more
for a can of soda. More recently, thanks to the widespread proliferation of data collection, personalized pricing
has become feasible: these methods set prices for an individual based on their features. For an overview of the
research on dynamic pricing, we refer the reader to the survey by den Boer [10].
The work closest in spirit to ours is in the research of computation and theory for personalized pricing methods.
Broadly speaking, the related work can be divided into two categories: 1) work that focuses on algorithmic
3methods to compute pricing strategies using available data, and 2) work that focuses on characterizing game-
theoretic equilibrium of the interactions between a consumer and a seller when the seller uses personalized
pricing strategies.
Typically, from an algorithmic perspective, one supposes that there is an unknown mapping between the
consumer’s observable features and their willingness-to-pay, and the goal of these methods is to learn this
mapping online while simultaneously experiencing rewards/costs during the learning process. The observable
features are often referred to as contextual information, and include data such as a consumer’s browsing history.
It is not uncommon to assume that the consumers are myopic or non-strategic. In this case, the seller sets
prices to trade-off exploration and exploitation: exploration seeks to learn how observable features affect the
consumer’s reservation prices, while exploitation seeks to use existing knowledge to maximize revenue in the
short term. Cohen et al. [9] and Mao et al. [22] study the problem of dynamic pricing for a set of differentiated
products, and how observable features affect the market value of these products. Qiang and Bayati [24] learns a
demand function for a product and maximizes reward, assuming that some demand covariates are observed at
every time step. Javanmard and Nazerzadeh [16] explore dynamic pricing techniques when the features live in a
high-dimensional space. Nambiar et al. [23] use random price shocks to encourage exploration. Ban and Keskin
[4] models personalized pricing with repeated interactions with a consumer, but this consumer’s demand is a
fixed function of the price offered and the observable features. Shah et al. [27] studies the problem of revenue
maximization in a semi-parametric setting, where the success/failure of each sale is determined by if the price
is below the consumer’s valuation. Levina et al. [19] uses an online learning approach to maximize revenue
accounting for time, remaining inventory and price, viewing the consumer’s behavior as a fixed and known
function of time. Effectively, in all of these works, the formulation is equivalent to a non-strategic consumer who
makes a purchase when their product valuation exceeds the offered price.
More relevant to our approach is work that assumes the consumers are strategic. Some applications of dynamic
pricing do not permit the assumption that consumers are myopic. In this case, issues of incentive compatibility
and robustness to strategic manipulation become the focus of the pricing methods. Amin et al. [1] model the
situation where a seller uses repeated interactions with a consumer to learn about the consumer’s underlying
valuation. In this setting, the consumer knows her valuation and is strategic. Under the assumption that the seller
is more patient than the consumer (i.e. the consumer discounts the future more than the seller), Amin et al. [1]
provide a no-regret algorithm, where regret is defined against the revenue when the consumer is non-strategic.
Kanoria and Nazerzadeh [17] assume the seller uses historical information to infer the distribution of valuations,
which opens the seller up to strategic manipulation. They demonstrate how to implement an incentive-compatible
mechanism. Golrezaei et al. [12] consider repeated interactions between the same seller and consumer, and
they assume the consumer is strategic. They develop pricing algorithms for the seller that utilize contextual
information and are robust to the strategic decisions of the consumer. They introduce epochs which introduce
a lag before a consumer’s data is used to determine prices; because of the consumer’s discount factor, this lag
reduces the gains from strategic manipulation. Additionally, the seller periodically clears his data, which limits
the long-term benefits for the consumer from strategically manipulating data. Under certain conditions, their
method ensures that consumers cannot gain from strategically manipulating their data. These works focus on
developing algorithms for the seller,
In contrast to these works, we focus on how consumers can react to personalized pricing algorithms. We
view the pricing strategies of the seller as both fixed and given, and define how the consumer can behave
to maximize their own payoff, subject to their own informational constraints. Against robust algorithms or
incentive-compatible mechanisms, the method in this paper may not provide much benefit for the consumer.
However, many of the personalized pricing algorithms in practice are not designed to handle strategic behavior,
and, in these settings, our proposed methods can provide the consumer with some utility gain.
4Complementing the algorithmic approaches to this problem are more game-theoretic approaches. These
methods seek to characterize the equilibrium behavior of agents. Stokey [29] considers as game where the seller
announces prices in advance, and the consumer must decide when to buy or reject the good. Besanko and
Winston [6] characterize the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in seller/consumer interactions using dynamic
programming. Their model features hidden information which slowly gets revealed by the agent’s actions across
time. Chade and de Serio [8] consider an infinite-horizon, two-type model, and characterize how the seller’s best
responses change as information revelation varies. Su [30] supposes that the consumer takes on four possible
types, which correspond to combinations of high/low valuation and patient/impatient discount factors, and
characterize how the equilibrium change as the distribution of types vary. Loginova and Taylor [20] consider a
two-period model and demonstrate when price discrimination would occur. Aviv and Pazgal [3] analyze how to
optimally price a good when the value of the good is time-varying: prices are declared in advance, they analyze
the effect of strategic consumers on expected revenues. In this work, the strategic consumer’s strategy is shown
to be a thresholding policy. Levin et al. [18] prove the optimality conditions for a sub-game perfect equilibrium
for the stochastic dynamic game between the consumer and the seller, also utilizing a dynamic programming
approach.
The main difference in our work is that we consider the process of exogenous information discovery. Prior
work in these game-theoretic formulations focused on the effects of signaling: in particular, the consumer knows
her own valuation, and when she does not purchase the good at time t for price pt , she reveals information about
her private valuation. In our work, we focus on the effects of information discovery: the consumer does not
know her own valuation, and as time passes, the consumer learns more information about her own valuation.
Meanwhile, the seller learns more contextual information about the consumer. Practically, this difference means
that their formulations admit a dynamic programming analysis different from ours: we must use conditional
expectations and the Snell envelope due to how the consumer learns about her valuation across time. In contrast,
the previous works could implement a value function directly on the action space.
Additionally, due to the complexity of these processes, in our work we restrict ourselves to fixing the seller’s
pricing strategies and computing the consumer’s approximate best response. This contrasts with the cited works,
which either characterize equilibrium of the strategic interactions between the consumer and seller or characterize
the seller’s best response. Thus, our focus in this paper is providing computational methods for the consumer,
which can be applied in any settings where a consumer must learn under surveillance.
Finally, much of our computational methods are drawn from the mathematical finance literature. The problem
of computing an optimal stopping time arises in the pricing of American options, which are options that can
be exercised at any time. The value of an American option must weigh the value of being able to exercise the
option in the future with the known payoff of exercising the option immediately. For an overview of the financial
interpretations of optimal stopping times, we refer the reader to Föllmer and Schied [11]. In this paper, we
use Monte Carlo methods for the computation of stopping times, which were developed in part by Carriere
[7] and Tsitsiklis and van Roy [31] but popularized in the computational finance community by Longstaff and
Schwartz [21]. For a theoretical analysis of pricing American options, we refer the reader to Haugh and Kogan
[15] and Rogers [25].
3 MODEL
In this section, we introduce our model for the consumer’s purchasing decision. We define the relevant payoffs
when the consumer makes a purchase at time t , when she stops browsing without a purchase at time t , and when
she chooses to continue browsing at time t . The setting is dynamic, so we specify our model for the consumer’s
state of information and its evolution, as well as the relationship between the payoffs of the consumer at different
steps in time.
53.1 Overview
Our model is a discrete-time, finite horizon interaction, with time indices T = {0, 1, . . . ,T }. We assume that the
consumer is considering the purchase of a single, indivisible good. To decide whether or not to do so, she learns
about her valuation at each time step, while simultaneously revealing information to a seller. Throughout this
document, we will refer to the ‘consumer’ with the pronouns she/her and, similarly, we will refer to the ‘seller’
with the pronouns he/him.
As is common in the literature [3, 12], we assume that the seller credibly commits to pricing strategies (pt )t ∈T
prior to the consumer’s first decision at t = 0. Here, pt are random variables, which incorporate the seller’s
information about the consumer. This assumption is motivated by the general observation that when consumers
are fully informed and rational, firms earn more revenue when they can credibly pre-commit to a pricing
strategy [3, 14, 26].
The order of events at each time step t ∈ T are:
• Given his available information at t , the seller calculates the offered price at time t , denoted pt , and
communicates this price to the consumer.
• The consumer sees the price and then decides between 3 choices: 1) purchase the good, receive a payoff πt
that depends on her current information and price, and end the interaction; 2) reject the good, receive a
payoff of 0, and end the interaction; 3) continue browsing, and the game continues. If t = T , then choice (3)
is unavailable, and the consumer must either purchase or reject the good.
• If the consumer chooses to continue, both the consumer and the seller learn of new information, and the
process repeats.
3.2 Consumer model
In this subsection, we present the formal details of our model. As stated previously, the underlying probability
space is denoted (Ω,A, P).
The seller chooses prices based on his available information; these prices are modeled as random variables.
pt (ω) denotes the price offered at time t , and we will refer to pt : Ω → R as a pricing strategy. The offered price
pt (ω) implicitly depends on the seller’s information about the consumer. The consumer’s goal is to decide when
to purchase or reject the good in an optimal way, based on her available information at each time step. Since the
seller announces his pricing strategies at the beginning of the game, we will consider the functions (pt )t ∈T as
fixed and known.
We represent the consumer’s state of information at each time t as a σ -algebra: let Ft ⊆ A denote the
consumer’s state of information at time t . We assume that the consumer has perfect recall, i.e. she remembers all
past information available to her. Formally, this means that the sequence F = (F0,F1, . . . ,FT ) is a filtration; in
other words, F0 ⊆ F1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ FT . Since the price pt (ω) is announced at time t , we note that pt (ω) is known to
the consumer at time t , i.e. pt ∈ Ft . For clarity of presentation, in the sequel we well drop the ω argument from
random variables.
First, we define the consumer’s payoffs when she purchases the good. In our model, if she purchases the good
at time t , she will receive payoff πt , where πt is an Ft measurable function which depends on the offered price pt .
That is, we assume she knows what payoff she will receive if she chooses to purchase the good at time t .
Remark 1. We emphasize that knowing πt is not the same as assuming that she knows her valuation of the
good. We simply assume that she knows the payoff she will get from purchasing the good, at her current state of
information’s risk and uncertainty.
On the other hand, if she rejects the good at time t , she will neither receive the good nor pay any price. In this
case, she receives payoff 0.
6With her payoffs defined, we note that we can combine the ‘purchase’ and ‘reject’ actions into a single ‘exit’
action. In this case, she ends the game and receives payoff Ht = πt ∨ 0. This means that whenever she chooses to
‘exit’ and end the game, she will always choose the higher payoff between ‘purchase’ and ‘reject’. Much of the
analysis from this point on is greatly simplified notationally by the introduction of this ‘exit’ action with payoff
Ht .
Now, we introduce the notion of a stopping time for discrete-time filtrations.
Definition 1. For any filtration F , we say that a T-valued random element τ is a stopping time adapted to F ,
or sometimes a F stopping time, if the set {τ = t} is Ft measurable for all t ∈ T.
Thus, the consumer’s decision is to pick a stopping time, i.e. she decides whether or not to ‘exit’ based on
the information currently available to her. Given a stopping time, the choice of whether to ‘purchase’ or ‘reject’
when exiting is straightforward: whichever has the higher payoff will be chosen. When the consumer chooses a
stopping time τ , the payoff she receives in expectation is E[Hτ ].
In summary, the consumer’s decision of when to ‘purchase’ or ‘reject’ the good can be reduced to a choice of
when to ‘exit’, given her available information. The payoff from ‘exit’ (denoted Ht ) is the maximum of the payoff
from ‘purchase’ (denoted πt ) and the payoff from ‘reject’ (which is 0). When the seller’s pricing strategies (pt )t
are treated as fixed, the processes (πt )t and (Ht )t can be taken as given. Her feasible strategies of when to ‘exit’
(given her available information) is formalized as a stopping time, and the ex-ante expected payoff she receives is
E[Hτ ].
3.3 Example: Gaussian model with myopic pricing
In this subsection, we outline a specific example of the general model outlined above. We consider the case where
all the relevant values and observations are drawn from Gaussian distributions. In this model, the consumer
learns about her true underlying valuation across time. Meanwhile, the seller receives noisy measurements of the
consumer’s valuation, which, at each time step, allows the seller to better estimate the true underlying valuation
as well. Additionally, the seller sets prices to myopically maximize his expected revenue at each time step. This
example will be used for numerical simulations in Section 6.
We model the consumer’s valuation process as follows. Initially, the consumer has some initial estimate of
her valuation, v0. At each time t , she makes an observation ϵt , where ϵt > 0 increases her valuation of the good
and ϵt < 0 decreases her valuation. More formally, she learns vt = vt−1 + ϵt , where ϵt ∼ N (0,σ 2ϵ ) independently
across time. Her final valuation is denoted v = vT , and is interpreted as the true underlying valuation. Thus, her
posterior of v given her available information at time t is v ∼ N (vt , (T − t)σ 2ϵ ). As time progresses, the variance
is decreasing, until time t = T when she knows her true valuation v with certainty.
In addition, the consumer is offered a price pt at time t . This means that, should the consumer accept the
price and make a purchase, her rewards are distributed according a Gaussian random variable with mean vt − pt
and variance (T − t)σ 2ϵ . We assume the consumer is risk averse, and, in particular, her utility can be modeled
by a CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) utility function, given by u(x) = 1 − exp(−γx) for some parameter
γ > 0. Thus, at time t , should she make a purchase, her utility from purchase will be πt = 1−E[exp(−γX )] where
X ∼ N (vt − pt , (T − t)σ 2ϵ ). This can be calculated from the moment generating function of a normal distribution,
which yields the utility:
πt = 1 − exp(−γ (vt − pt )) exp
(
1
2γ
2(T − t)σ 2ϵ
)
(1)
We note that even though (vt )t is a martingale and the valuation remains the same in expectation across time,
ceteris paribus, the consumer’s payoff increases across time. This is due to the risk aversion in her utility function:
holding other factors constant, as time increases, her uncertainty decreases (i.e. the variance of v given vt is
decreasing across time), which leads to higher utility.
7In this example, her state of information at time t is Ft = σ (v0, ϵ1, . . . , ϵt ,p0, . . . ,pt ). We can see that πt ,
defined in Equation (1), is Ft measurable. As mentioned in Remark 1, even though the consumer does not know
v = vT at time t < T , she can calculate πt , which is her payoff from a purchase. The payoff from exit is defined as
Ht = πt ∨ 0, and any stopping time τ adapted to the filtration F = (F0, . . . ,FT ) will yield expected payoff E[Hτ ].
Now, we define the seller’s pricing strategies (pt )t . From the seller’s perspective, we suppose he receives noisy
observations of the consumer’s current valuation vt . Thus, at time t > 0, the seller receives yt = vt + ξt where
ξt ∼ N (0,σ 2ξ ) are independent across time. The seller also has a prior on the consumer’s initial valuation, so,
from his perspective, at time t = 0, v0 ∼ N (µ,σ 2v ) for some parameters µ,σ 2v . Note that all the measurements of
the seller are actually functions of information available to the consumer, i.e. the seller has less information than
the consumer about her valuation. As such, the prices do not inform the consumer about her valuation.
In this formulation, the seller’s estimation problem is a linear-quadratic estimation problem. That is:
v0 ∼ N (µ,σ 2v ) vt+1 = vt + ϵt ϵt ∼ N (0,σ 2ϵ ) yt = vt + ξt ξt ∼ N (0,σ 2ξ )
The posterior of vt given y0, . . . ,yt is a Gaussian random variable, whose mean and variance can be calculated
recursively using the Kalman filter.
The seller uses his estimate of the consumer’s valuation to set prices. At time t , we suppose the seller chooses
pt that maximizes p · Pr(vt > p). This assumes two things. First, the seller myopically optimizes the expected
revenue in their current time step. Second, he believes the consumer is similarly myopic; he believes the consumer
will purchase the good whenever their valuation vt exceeds the offered price pt , i.e. whenever vt > pt .
So, the seller’s behavior at each time step is as follows. He calculates the posterior of vt given y0, . . . ,yt using
the Kalman filter, and then he chooses p to maximize p · Pr(vt > p), which determines the price pt offered at
time t . Noting the distribution of vt , this amounts to maximizing p ·Q
(
p−µt
σt
)
, where µt and σ 2t are the mean and
variance of the seller’s posterior at time t (calculated by the Kalman filter), and theQ-function isQ(z) = Pr(Z > z)
for a standard normal random variable Z .
4 DISCRETE-TIME OPTIMAL STOPPING THEORY
In Section 3, we introduced our mathematical formulation of the consumer’s decision of when to purchase or
reject a good, accounting for her incomplete and dynamically evolving information state. Her decision reduces to
the choice of a stopping time, and we defined the ex-ante expected payoff she receives for any given stopping
time τ . In this section, we will introduce the formalism required to define an optimal stopping time, and provide
the theoretical tools to calculate the optimal stopping time. However, the theoretical tools may not be easy to
compute in practice, which we address in Section 5.
4.1 Optimal stopping times
To define an optimal stopping time, we first must introduce the definition of the essential supremum of a family
of random variables. Note that this definition differs from the more common notion of essential supremum, which
refers to the essential supremum of a single random variable.
Proposition 1 (Existence of the essential supremum ([11], Theorem A.32)). For any arbitrary collection
of random variables Φ, there exists a countable subset Φc ⊆ Φ with the following property: if we define φ∗(ω) =
supφ ∈Φc φ(ω), then φ∗ ≥ φ almost surely for all ϕ ∈ Φ.
Additionally, this random variable φ∗ is almost surely unique in the sense that for any random variableψ , the
following holds:ψ ≥ φ almost surely for all φ ∈ Φ implies thatψ ≥ φ∗ almost surely.
Definition 2 (Essential supremum). We call φ∗, as defined in Proposition 1, the essential supremum of Φ, and
denote it ess sup Φ.
8The definition of essential supremum is needed due to technical conditions, as the point-wise supremum over
an arbitrary set of random variables need not be measurable. The essential supremum provides a measurable
function φ∗ which almost surely satisfies the desired properties of a point-wise supremum.1
Let T denote the set of stopping times adapted to F . An optimal stopping time τ ∗ ∈ T is one that satisfies the
equality almost surely:
E[Hτ ∗ ] = ess sup
τ ∈T
E[Hτ ]
4.2 The Snell envelope
Our formulation allows us to cast the consumer’s decision as an optimal stopping time problem, which allows
us to solve for the optimal purchasing strategy using dynamic programming approaches. For the discrete-time,
finite-horizon problem, the Snell envelope provides a method to calculate the optimal stopping time.
Let us define the Snell envelope of the random process H .
Definition 3 (Snell envelope). Let H be a random process adapted to F . The Snell envelope U of H is the
random process recursively defined as follows.UT = HT , andUt = Ht ∨ E[Ut+1 |Ft ] for t < T .
From this definition, we make a few quick observations. First,U is adapted to F . Second,U is a supermartingale
by construction:Ut ≥ E[Ut+1 |Ft ] for each t < T . Third,U dominates H , again by construction:Ut ≥ Ht .
While the process H represents the value Ht of ‘exit’ at time t , the Snell envelopeUt at time t represents the
value of having the flexibility of ‘exiting’ at any time s ∈ {t , . . . ,T }, where the payoff from ‘exit’ at each time s is
Hs . At time T , the consumer must ‘exit’, so UT = HT . Prior to that,Ut must always at least be worth the value of
‘exit’ the option at time t , and its value is the maximum of the current value of ‘exit’ Ht and the expected value of
optimally choosing when to ‘exit’ from time t + 1 onward, conditioned on the currently available information
E[Ut+1 |Ft ].
We define the stopping time τmin as follows:
τmin = min {s ∈ T : Us = Hs }
Note that since UT = HT , the minimum is well-defined, and since both terms are F adapted, τmin is a valid
stopping time.
Proposition 2 (Optimality of τmin ([11], Theorem 6.20)). For the Snell envelope U of H , we have U0 =
E
[
Hτmin
]
= ess supτ ∈T E[Hτ ].
Proposition 2 tells us that we can use the Snell envelope to explicitly calculate the consumer’s best strategy
against a seller who credibly commits to pricing strategies (pt )t in advance. That is, at each time step t , it is
optimal for the consumer to ‘exit’ if τmin = t .
5 COMPUTATION OF OPTIMAL STOPPING TIMES
In Section 4, we outlined how the consumer’s optimal stopping time problem can be solved using the Snell
envelope. This provides us with an algorithm which can maximize a consumer’s welfare in settings of surveillance
capitalism, where a consumer must trade-off between learning more about a product and revealing more about
her preferences. The main modeling assumption that allowed us to use optimal stopping time methods was
the assumption that the seller pre-commits to pricing strategies. This assumption allows us to take the pricing
strategies (pt )t as given, which removes many of the game-theoretic interactions between the consumer and the
seller.
1We can see φ∗ is measurable as it is defined as the supremum over a countable set of random variables.
9ALGORITHM 1: A recursive method for training the algorithmic stopping method, which approximates the Snell envelope.
Input: N sample paths (Hn0 ,Hn1 , . . . ,HnT ) for n ∈ 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1.
Output: Functions ( fˆ0, fˆ1, . . . , fˆT−1) that approximate the conditional expectations of the Snell envelope,
i.e. fˆt (Ht ) ≈ E[Ut+1 |Ft ].
// Initialize the future payoff matrix CF with the base case.
For all n, set CFnT = H
n
T ;
// Recursively calculate the future payoff matrix CF and fˆt .
for t = T-1,T-2,. . . ,0 do
// Find the sample paths with non-zero payoff at time t .
Nt = {n : Hnt > 0};
// Regress the future payoffs on the current value of Ht , restricting to sample paths Nt .
if Nt is empty then
fˆt = 0;
else
fˆt = regress (maxs>t CFns )n∈Nt on (Hnt )n∈Nt ;
end
// Calculate the approximate optimal strategy at time t .
for all n do
// This condition means it would better to stop at t than future times on this sample path n.
if Hnt > fˆt (Hnt ) then
CFnt = H
n
t ; CFnt+1 = 0, CF
n
t+2 = 0, . . .CF
n
T = 0;
end
end
end
return ( fˆ0, . . . , fˆT−1)
However, even in this simplified case, the algorithm provided in Section 4 is primarily theoretical. Modeling
the filtration F = (Ft )t for realistic pricing functions is non-trivial, and, furthermore, calculating the appropriate
conditional expectations and recursions may be computationally quite difficult. In this section, we present an
algorithm which allows the consumer to explicitly calculate an approximation of her optimal stopping time.
Throughout this section, we assume that the consumer has the capacity to sample from her valuations and the
(potentially random) pricing strategy. In particular, she can draw independent path samples (Hnt )t ∈T to train an
estimator for the Snell envelope.
5.1 Algorithmic stopping method
In this paper, we use Monte Carlo methods to estimate the conditional expectation operators. As mentioned in
Section 2, the method presented here builds on the works of Carriere [7], Tsitsiklis and van Roy [31], and Longstaff
and Schwartz [21]. The algorithm takes N sample paths (Hn0 , . . . ,HnT )n∈N as input. From this, the algorithm
proceeds backwards in time, using sample paths to build estimators fˆt ≈ E[Ut+1 |Ft ]. The training algorithm is
presented in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 works as follows. It calculates the payoff for each sample path. At time t , (CFns )s≥t represents the
future incoming payoff at each time s ≥ t . Since the formulation allows us to only stop once, it will be non-zero
in at most one time s . For emphasis, CFns is non-zero at the time index s where it is optimal to stop given the
available information. It will not choose the maximal element of Hns , but rather it will choose the first time when
the current payoff Hnt exceeds the estimated future payoffs fˆt (Hnt ).
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ALGORITHM 2: Online implementation of the algorithmic stopping method.
Input: Trained estimators ( fˆt )t and an input stream of payoffs (Ht )t .
Output: A time t to purchase/reject the good, and a decision of purchase or reject.
for t = 0,1,. . . ,T-1 do
// Compare Ht with the estimate of E[Ut+1 |Ft ].
if Ht > fˆt (Ht ) then
// Make a purchase immediately.
return (t , purchase)
end
end
// At the final time step, decide whether to purchase or reject based on the payoff.
if HT > 0 then
return (T , purchase)
else
return (T , reject)
end
Many works differ based on the regression method used; we present the algorithm in a fashion that is agnostic
to the regression method used. Carriere [7] uses spline interpolation as a regression technique, whereas Tsitsiklis
and van Roy [31] and Longstaff and Schwartz [21] choose basis functions and use least-squares regression
methods. The general algorithm is provided in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 introduces one relaxation, which is common in the literature [21]. Rather than approximate
E[Ut+1 |Ft ], we approximate E[Ut+1 |Ht ]. Note that the space of σ (Ht )-measurable functions will be a subspace
of Ft -measurable functions (since Ht ∈ Ft ). This is motivated by computational reasons. For example, if we
modeled Ft = σ (X0, . . . ,Xt ) for some random variables (Xt )t , the dimension of the domain of regression would
grow across time, requiring increasing amounts of data for longer time horizons. This relaxation is motivated by
the intuition that the most recent payoff Ht provides most of the information about future payoffs, i.e. E[Ut+1 |Ht ]
is close to E[Ut+1 |Ft ].
Finally, it is important to note that Algorithm 1 has one more quirk: it removes sample paths that currently
have zero payoff (i.e. paths n where Hnt = 0) prior to regression. This idea was introduced by Longstaff and
Schwartz [21]. This is done to reduce bias in the trained estimator, since the process Ht is thresholded at 0. Put
another way, Hnt = πt ∨ 0, so the underlying process (πt )t could be in many different states to yield the payoff
Hnt = 0. Thus, when regressing, the data would not be informative when Hnt = 0. To reduce the bias introduced
as a result, we do not include sample paths with zero payoff at time t in the regression.
Finally, once the training is done, to implement the algorithmic stopping method, the deployment is straight-
forward. Using the estimators fˆt , we compare the current payoff Ht with the estimate of the future payoffs fˆt ,
and exit when the current payoff is higher. Additionally, note that if the decision is to purchase/reject the good at
time t , this depends only on the values (H0, . . . ,Ht ), as desired. Thus, the algorithm defines a valid stopping time.
The details are provided in Algorithm 2.
5.2 Regression via reproducing kernel Hilbert space methods
Algorithm 1 is presented in a fashion that is agnostic to the regression method used. For our implementation, we
used reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) methods.
First, let’s present a quick overview on RKHS methods. For more details, we refer the reader to Aronszajn [2].
LetH be a RKHS whose elements are functions fˆ that map input features X to output values in R. Furthermore,
let k : X × X → R be the corresponding kernel ofH . Then, consider the infinite-dimensional, non-parametric
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problem of minimizing the empirical risk for some dataset (xi ,yi )di=1 ∈ (X × R)d :
min
fˆ ∈H
d∑
i=1
 fˆ (xi ) − yi2 (2)
To find a fˆ that minimizes the above function, the Representer Theorem states that it suffices to search over the
span of the finite set of functions {x 7→ k(xi ,x)}di=1 [2]. Thus, the optimization in Equation (2) can be reduced to
the finite-dimensional optimization problem:
min
w ∈Rd
d∑
i=1
 d∑
j=1
w jk(x j ,xi ) − yi
2
The resulting estimator is determined by θ = (w,x1, . . . ,xd ):
fˆt (x ;θ ) =
d∑
j=1
w jk(x j ,x)
In this paper, we use the Gaussian kernel k(x ,y) = exp(−∥x − y∥2/2σ 2), parameterized by σ > 0.
6 NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we demonstrate the efficacy of the computational methods introduced in Section 5 on a numerical
example. For these simulations, we use the model outlined in Section 3.3.
We used the following parameters. First, we drew N = 500 sample paths as a training dataset for Algorithm 1,
which we refer to as the algorithmic stoppingmethod in this section. The time horizon wasT = 25. The consumer’s
parameter for risk aversion was γ = 1. We set σϵ = 0.1, which represents how much the consumer’s uncertainty
about her own valuation decreases across time. We set σξ = 1, which is the noise in the seller’s observations of
the consumer valuation. Similarly, we set the prior for the seller’s estimate with the parameters µ = 1 and σv = 1.
For the purposes of these simulations, we drew the initial valuations v0 according to the prior N (µ,σ 2v ) as well.
Finally, the parameter for the Gaussian kernel in our reproducing kernel Hilbert space method was chosen as
σ = 1. For Figure 2, we used 15 test trials to illustrate the behavior of trajectories, and for Figures 3 and 4 we
used 1,000 test trials to evaluate the distributions of our algorithm’s performance. The data in these figures use
estimators trained on N = 500 training sample paths.
In Figure 1, we provide a sample trajectory to illustrate the behavior of the algorithmic stopping method at the
level of a single sample path. In the top figure, the green regions indicate the consumer’s uncertainty about her
own valuation decreasing across time as she learns. Similarly, as time passes, the seller makes observations and
forms a better estimate of the consumer’s willingness to pay, as indicated by the blue line. At each time step,
the seller chooses a price to offer the consumer (the red line), which attempts to maximize expected revenue
against myopic consumers. For this sample path, we can note a few things. First, even though the expected value
of her valuation is above the offered price at time t = 7, her payoff is not positive due to the risk aversion in
her utility function. However, at time t = 13, her payoff is positive due to the decreased uncertainty across time.
However, for this realization, the price drops significantly after a few more time steps, and the time chosen by
the algorithmic stopping method t = 19 yields a significantly higher payoff, due to both the consumer’s reduced
uncertainty in her own valuation as well as lower offered prices. The algorithmic stopping method decides when
it is better in expectation to continue learning, reduce uncertainty, and potentially wait for prices to drop, whereas
the myopic purchasing strategy greedily makes a purchase at the first time the payoff is positive.
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Fig. 1. A sample trajectory where the algorithmic stopping method performs better than the myopic purchasing strategy.
In the top plot, the green line represents the consumer’s uncertainty about her own valuation, the blue line represents the
seller’s estimate of the consumer’s valuation, and the red line represents the prices offered at each time step. The shaded
regions represent ±1.5 standard deviations from the mean. In the bottom plot, the green line represents Ht = πt ∨ 0, the
payoff from exit at each time step. The light-blue line represents the time chosen by the algorithmic stopping method, and
the brown line represents the time chosen by a myopic purchasing strategy.
In Figure 2, we show the valuation, price, and payoff at the time of exit for both the algorithmic stopping
method and the myopic purchasing strategy. We see that the behavior along sample paths falls into 3 general
categories.
• First, trials 0, 1, 7, 8, 12, 13, and 14 show that the algorithmic stopping method and myopic purchasing
strategy agree on their decision of when to exit, and the payoff received is the same as a consequence.
• Second, we see trajectories where the algorithmic stopping method is able to receive higher payoff by
waiting for price changes in the future or a reduction in uncertainty, as shown in trials 3, 6, 10, and 11. In
trials 3 and 11, the higher payoff are primarily from waiting for lower prices, and in trials 6 and 10, the
higher payoff arises primarily from a reduction in uncertainty.
• The third outcome (trials 2, 4, 5, and 9) arises when the algorithmic stopping time decides to wait, and
either never sees a good opportunity for purchase again, or eventually has to settle for a higher price than
originally offered. In particular, the algorithmic stopping method is not better than the greedy strategy
for all sample paths, which is not possible given the limited information available. Rather, it endeavors to
be better in expectation. In trials 2, 4, and 9, we see that the algorithmic stopping method never makes
a purchase, while the greediness of the myopic purchasing strategy nets some positive payoff. In trial 5,
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Fig. 2. The valuation, price, and payoffs at the time of exit of the two strategies across the same sample paths. In the top
plot, the region between the bars represent ± 1.5 standard deviations from the expected value for the consumer’s valuation
at the time of exit, chosen by the algorithmic stopping method (light-blue) and the myopic purchasing strategy (brown). The
red x indicates the price offered at the time of exit. A black star indicates that a purchase was made, and is placed at the
mean of the valuation at the time of exit. The absence of a black star means that no purchase was made. In the bottom plot,
the corresponding payoffs from exit are given.
we see that the algorithmic stopping method is forced to make a purchase at a worse price due to bad
realizations of the sample path.
In Figure 3, we demonstrate a histogram of payoffs and prices paid across 1,000 trials. In the top figure, we
can see that the algorithmic stopping method receives 0 payoff more often than a myopic purchasing strategy;
our proposed method encourages waiting for prices to potentially drop in the future, as well as the increased
payoff from reduced uncertainty for a risk-averse agent. For some sample paths, it will be better to take the
greedy approach and make a purchase as soon as there is positive payoff, which explains why the algorithmic
stopping method has a higher percentage of trials at 0. However, in other sample paths, we find that the payoffs
are higher for the algorithmic stopping method as a result of its patience, as we can see by the higher weights
around payoffs of 0.25 to 0.6.
From the bottom figure, we can see the distribution of prices paid when purchases are made. The price is only
included in this figure if a purchase was made. Since all our trials were initialized to the same seller prior, the
offered price at time t = 0 is the same for every trial, which explains the giant peak at 1.1, which corresponds to
sample paths where a purchase was made immediately. The algorithmic stopping method oftentimes sees lower
prices, but also sometimes sees higher prices, as demonstrated in this histogram. This histogram hints that the
increased payoffs from the top figure primarily arise due to reduced uncertainty rather than better prices.
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Fig. 3. Histograms of the payoffs and prices paid across 1,000 trials. In the top plot, we show the payoffs from following the
algorithmic stopping method as well as a myopic purchasing strategy for all 1,000 trials. In the bottom plot, we show the
prices paid when following the algorithmic stopping method and myopic purchasing strategy; prices are included only from
trials where a purchase was made. Of the 1,000 trials, the algorithmic stopping method made a purchase 685 times and the
myopic purchasing strategy made a purchase 825 times.
In Figure 4, we plot the differences between the payoff chosen by the algorithmic stopping method and the
myopic purchase strategy. In 367/1000 trials, both methods choose the same payoff, corresponding a large amount
of the mass around 0. (The histogram shows that about 40% of sample paths had payoffs very close to each other,
even if not exactly equal to each other.) The average increase in payoff from the algorithmic stopping method is
0.07, which with these simulation parameters, is a significant increase. (For context, the average payoff across
1,000 trials from the myopic purchase strategy is 0.23.) We can see that this method is not without downside
risk, as well, as there are many sample paths where the payoff is worse. However, we do see improvements in
expectation.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we formalized the problem a consumer faces when a seller uses personalized pricing algorithms.
The consumer must balance between learning more about a potential purchase, and revealing more information
about herself in the process. Under the key assumption that the seller credibly commits to pricing strategies, the
consumer’s decision can be reduced to the selection of a stopping time. Thus, the consumer’s problem can be
translated into one commonly studied in mathematical finance: the pricing of American options. We present
both a theoretical characterization of optimal stopping times as well as algorithms to compute a stopping time
given a training dataset of sample paths.
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Fig. 4. Histograms of the difference between the algorithmic stopping payoff and the myopic purchase payoff across 1,000
trials. The red line indicates the empirical average difference, which is 0.07.
For future work, we hope to better understand pricing strategies: instead of treating pricing strategies as
exogenously fixed (as considered in this paper), how would a seller choose a pricing strategy, given that the
consumer is using an algorithmic stopping method to make purchasing decisions? The resulting interaction would
become a Stackelberg game, or a bi-level optimization, where the lower-level optimization is an optimization
across stopping times. More generally, if we remove the seller’s ability to credibly commit to pricing strategies
in advance, what are the game-theoretic properties of this interaction? If agents use our algorithmic stopping
method, how does this affect the behavior and performance of current personalized pricing algorithms?
Broadly speaking, we believe these types of problems to be understudied. There is significant effort in the study
of how to design advertisements and personalize prices to maximize revenue for the sellers in these situations,
but these formulations often do not account for the welfare and utility of the consumers they target. In this
paper, we focus on algorithmic methods in which users can intelligently decide how much data to share, or when
it’s best to commit early to certain decisions before some observer learns too much about them. The hope is to
develop tools that can protect consumers against the widespread usage of their personal data against them.
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